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Introduction  
The architecture of contemporary global climate governance is characterized by a complex 
relationship between public and private authority. While intergovernmental decision-making 
at diplomatic conferences remains central in global climate politics, several authors have 
noted that private actors adopt and perform various governance functions that formerly rested 
solely with governments (Jagers and Stripple 2003: 388-389; Pattberg 2007: 8-17; Andonova, 
Betsill and Bulkeley 2009: 52). A prominent example of the mix of public and private 
authority in global climate policy-making is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
National governments maintain the supreme authority in the regulatory framework of the 
CDM, whereas the oversight and daily supervision of the project-based mechanism has been 
delegated to an intergovernmental body and further to private auditing corporations. 
According to many scholars and policy-makers, the privatization of authority is a long 
overdue step to overcome the shortcomings and failures of traditional government approaches 
and to increase the effectiveness of international regulation (for example Rosenau 1992; 
Commission on Global Governance 1995). While this might be true, this paper puts forward 
the argument that the trade-offs which accompany the shift from public to private authority 
have not been analyzed in enough detail. Therefore, this paper aims to analyze the 
consequences associated with the growing role of private actors in the field of global climate 
policy-making and focuses on the CDM as a particular instance of private authority in global 
climate governance. 
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The paper proceeds in four analytical steps. First, I discuss different theoretical 
approaches to the relatively recent phenomenon of private authority in global (environmental) 
governance and sketch a few examples of the growing involvement of private actors in global 
policy-making. Second, I give an overview about the CDM and briefly review the literature 
about this instrument. Third, I scrutinize the mix of public and private authority in the CDM 
by focusing on the delegation of authority to private auditing corporations and analyze their 
critical function in the regulatory framework of the CDM. Finally, I conclude with an 
evaluation of the role of these corporations in the CDM and point to factors that merit 
attention in future research on private authority in global governance. 
 
Private  authority  in  global  (environmental)  governance  
Authority is traditionally associated with the public sphere. Recent approaches to international 
relations, however, acknowledge that in the past decades, private actors have been 
increasingly engaged in authoritative decision-making (for example Rosenau 1995; Cutler, 
Haufler and Porter 1999a; Hall and Biersteker 2002a).1 Scholars of global environmental 
politics were among the first who pointed to the growing importance of private actors in 
global policy-making (cf. Falkner 2003: 75-76). Moreover, environmental politics has in the 
past few years served as a major empirical testing ground for the theoretical development of 
the concept of private authority in global governance. 
According to the relatively broad definition formulated by Claire Cutler, Virginia 
Haufler and Tony Porter, private authority can be understood as decision-making power over 
a particular issue-area that is exercised by private actors and accepted as legitimate by all 
stakeholders (1999b: 5). While Cutler, Haufler and Porter focus on cooperative arrangements 
between private economic actors, Rodney Hall and Thomas Biersteker adopt a more general 
approach to the emergence of private authority in global governance. They distinguish 
between moral, market-based and illicit forms of authority and argue that the empirical 
phenomenon of private authority has been largely neglected by classical approaches to 
international relations (Hall and Biersteker 2002b). More recently, Jessica Green has analyzed 
the emergence of private authority in global politics. She particularly investigates the 
authoritative role of private actors in global environmental policy-making (Green 2008a, 
2008b, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). In her latest studies, Green deepens the concept of private 
authority and differentiates between delegated private authority and entrepreneurial private 
                                                
1 Other scholars reject the thesis that states have lost dominance in the international system (for example Krasner 
1999). A recent elaboration of this argument is formulated by Drezner (2007). 
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authority. According to Green, delegated private authority requires a transfer of decision-
making power from states to private actors (2010b: 12). Entrepreneurial private authority, by 
contrast, emerges when stakeholders in a given issue-area defer to rules or standards that have 
been formulated by private actors without the explicit delegation of authority by states (Green 
2010b: 11-12). In the CDM several instances of entrepreneurial private authority can be 
identified, such as the Gold Standard, which is a private initiative to evaluate the 
environmental and sustainable development performance of CDM projects. The empirical 
focus in this paper, however, is on the delegation of authority from states via an 
intergovernmental body to private corporations. ??????s findings regarding the delegation of 
authority in global environmental politics show a mixed picture. Based on a quantitative 
analysis of more than 150 multilateral environmental agreements, she concludes that the 
delegation of authority to private actors is a relatively rare phenomenon in global 
environmental politics, which has, however, become more frequent in the past few years 
(Green 2008b, 2010a). Thus, while states generally appear to remain rather hesitant to 
delegate governance functions to private actors, the number of instances of delegated private 
authority has recently increased in global environmental policy-making. 
Scholars have identified different reasons for this development. One of the most 
common explanations is the declining financial and technical capacity of states to regulate 
increasingly complex issues (Strange 1996). Due to economic globalization as well as global 
environmental changes, states have partly lost control and authority over certain regulatory 
functions, with the result that public authority has been complemented by private structures of 
authority (cf. Pattberg 2007: 16). Another explanation is that states have deliberately chosen 
to transfer some of their authority into the economic realm in order to increase the 
effectiveness of international regulation (cf. Clapp 1998: 289). Through delegating authority 
to private actors, states aim to benefit from the division of labor, particularly from the 
specialized knowledge of the body performing the function (Hawkins et al. 2006). Slightly 
modifying this argument, Robert Falkner asserts that states may also aim to delegate the often 
complex task of regulation to private actors in order to save the costs of implementation and 
compliance (2003: 77). Other more critical scholars claim that states pursue the strategy to 
shift the responsibility for various social risks from the state to private economic actors (for 
example Shamir 2008). These critical accounts suggest that the declining capacity of states to 
effectively regulate in a globalizing and changing world is not the only reason for the growing 
involvement of private actors in global environmental policy-making (cf. Clapp 1998: 298). 
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In the past few years, several studies have identified various types of private 
governance arrangements that can be categorized as instances of private authority. First, 
scholars have ???????? ?????????????????? ?????????? ??????????? ??? international regimes2 and 
transferred the regime approach to the economic sector (Haufler 1995; Cutler, Haufler and 
Porter 1999a; Cutler 2002). These authors analyze the institutionalization of informal industry 
norms and rules and investigate the resulting impacts on the international system. Cutler, 
Haufler and Porter show that states not only recognize the principles, norms, rules and 
procedures negotiated by private firms, but also incorporate them into domestic as well as 
international regulatory structures (1999b). A prominent example of this type of private 
authority is the ISO 14000 series which has been drafted mainly by private corporations in the 
early 1990s in order to establish global environmental standards for industrial production and 
service provision (Clapp 1998). Several countries, mostly in Europe and East Asia, have 
adopted the ISO 14000 series as official standards. In addition, the World Trade Organization 
has recognized the ISO standards as international guidelines (Clapp 1998; Haufler 2001; 
Falkner 2003: 77). This gives, according to some scholars, additional legitimacy to private 
standard-setting activities (for example Falkner 2003: 77). Other authors, however, claim that 
privately formulated environmental standards are an instrument of the industry to obscure the 
persistence of environmentally harmful practices, especially in areas where public control is 
limited as in developing countries (for example Chatterjee and Finger 1994; Gleckman and 
Krut 1996). 
Second, a growing number of scholars focuses on public-private partnerships (for 
example Reinicke and Deng 2000; Börzel and Risse 2005; Bexell and Mörth 2010). These 
partnerships between, for instance, transnational corporations and intergovernmental 
organizations are involved in rule setting, rule implementation and the provision of public 
services. While public-private partnerships potentially increase the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of global governance by involving private actors in the design and implementation 
of policy-making instruments, little empirical evidence points to the environmental 
effectiveness of these new modes of governance (cf. Bäckstrand et al. 2010: 16-18). The 
question whether this type of private authority contributes to an effective provision of public 
goods and whether it can close the participation gap of international policy-making remains 
controversial (for example Pattberg and Stripple 2008: 380-382; Schäferhoff, Campe and 
Kaan 2009). 
                                                
2 Krasner defines international regimes as ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????(1983: 
2). 
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Third, and closely related to the concept of private international regimes, scholars pay 
increasing attention to new forms of strategic cooperation between private firms and their 
efforts to formulate voluntary codes of conduct to promote corporate social responsibility (cf. 
Pattberg 2007: 11). These voluntary codes of conduct supplement, to some extent, public 
???????????????????????????? ?????????????????-based actors exerting significant influence in 
?????????????????????????(Clapp 1998: 298). Proponents of this type of private authority argue 
that the corporate responsibility movement may help disseminating social norms in the global 
political economy (Haufler 2006). Recently, however, scholars have emphasized 
shortcomings of voluntary industry initiatives, such as the risk of ?window-dressing?? ???
?????????????? (for example Vogel 2005). According to critics, voluntary self-regulation may 
favor private interests at public expense and render public authorities vulnerable to regulatory 
capture (Cutler 2008: 207). 
In addition, private actors play authoritative roles in state-based international regimes.3 
They do not only lobby state representatives during intergovernmental negotiations, but also 
take on governance functions in the regulatory framework of international regimes. In the 
international climate regime, for instance, private auditing corporations are engaged as 
regulatory agents and have been put in charge to monitor the compliance of rules and 
procedures negotiated by national governments. Since the precise nature of how these private 
actors perform their functions has only marginally been addressed, this type of private 
authority will be examined in the following sections of this paper. While most of the instances 
of private authority sketched above can be classified as entrepreneurial or hybrid private 
authority ???????????????????????????????????????????, the latter example falls in the category 
of delegated private authority. 
In sum, there is increasing scholarly attention to the growing importance of private 
actors in global (environmental) policy-making. Several theoretical approaches have been 
developed to conceptualize the role of private actors in authoritative decision-making at the 
global level. As indicated above, the consequences associated with the growing involvement 
of private actors have, however, not been analyzed in much detail.4 Therefore, the remainder 
of this paper critically assesses the role of private auditing corporations in the regulatory 
framework of the CDM as an illustration of delegated private authority in global climate 
governance. 
                                                
3 While the early work on international regimes did not exclude the participation of private actors, many 
subsequent studies using the regime approach have neglected the considerable role of private actors in 
international regimes (cf. for example Rosenau 1995: 29; Levy and Newell 2005). 
4 A first step in this direction has recently been taken by Jönsson and Tallberg (2010). 
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A  brief  overview  of  the  CDM  
The CDM is one of three flexible mechanisms that have been established with the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997 in order to lower the overall economic costs of achieving greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission reduction targets.5 Its specific rules and procedures have been agreed upon 
by the parties in Marrakesh in 2001 and the first CDM project was registered in 2004 
(UNFCCC 2004). The basic idea of the mechanism is to allow companies from industrialized 
countries with emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex 1 countries) to 
gain Certified Emission Reductions by investing in projects that reduce emissions in 
developing countries (non-Annex 1 countries). The purpose of the CDM, defined in Article 12 
of the Kyoto Protocol, is twofold: First, the CDM aims to reduce the costs of Annex 1 
countries to meet their targets. Second, the project-based mechanism is supposed to assist 
non-Annex 1 countries to achieve sustainable development (UNFCCC 1997). Thus, the CDM 
can be seen as an institutional link between industrialized and developing countries that 
?seeks to bridge the demarcation between countries with emission reduction targets and those 
without in the UNFCCC [United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change]? 
(Stripple and Lövbrand 2010: 75). 
 
A short literature review 
Since its introduction, the CDM has been criticized for different reasons. Many scholars 
emphasize that the CDM has, so far, not significantly contributed to sustainable development 
in developing countries, one of its two key purposes (for example Cosbey et al. 2006; Olsen 
2007; Sutter and Parreno 2007). Moreover, authors criticize that the CDM draws off the 
attention from GHG emission reductions in industrialized countries and does not generate 
emission reductions on a global scale since the emissions reduced in developing countries are 
emitted elsewhere (Schneider 2007; Luhmann and Sterck 2008; Victor and Wara 2008). Some 
critical scholars even perceive the CDM as ?? ????? ??? ???????? ???????????? that enables 
industrialized countries to buy themselves out of their obligations while exacerbating 
environmental and social injustice at the global level (Bachram 2004; Lohmann 2006). 
Furthermore, authors point to the inequitable geographical distribution of CDM projects. 
While nearly 80 percent of the projects have been registered in Asia and the Pacific and more 
than 17 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa accounts for less than 2 percent of 
                                                
5 The two other flexible mechanisms introduced with the Kyoto Protocol are International Emissions Trading 
and Joint Implementation. For a comprehensive overview about these mechanisms see the work by Yamin and 
Depledge (2004: 136-196). 
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all registered projects (UNFCCC 2011b). In addition, scientists and civil society 
representatives hold that the CDM does not provide proper opportunities for local 
stakeholders to participate in the decision process whether a project is eligible or not 
(Michaelowa 2007; Olsen 2007; Lövbrand, Rindefjäll and Nordqvist 2009). Another criticism 
of the CDM concerns the additionality question of many projects (for example Figueres 2005; 
Michaelowa 2007; Purohit and Michaelowa 2007). According to the rules and procedures of 
the CDM, companies will receive carbon credits from a CDM project only if it leads to 
additional emission reductions, i.e. only if the project activity generates emission reductions 
that would not have been achieved in the alternative scenario to the implementation of the 
CDM project (UNFCCC 2006: 16). The question whether a project is additional can thus only 
be calculated through counterfactuals, which gives rise to methodological problems 
(Schneider 2007: 7-10). According to different scholars, many of these problems are a logical 
consequence of the current incentive structure built in the CDM which sets priority for cheap 
emission reductions and does not place enough value on sustainable development benefits 
(Ellis et al. 2007; Lövbrand, Rindefjäll and Nordqvist 2009; Stripple 2010). 
On the other hand, there are also arguments suggesting that the CDM is at least a 
partially successful market-based instrument. Most observers acknowledge that the CDM is 
working well in providing cost-efficient GHG emission reductions (for example Pattberg and 
Stripple 2008: 375). The CDM has produced a significant output of more than 2,700 
registered projects and an overall number of about 5,800 projects that are in the pipeline 
(UNEP Risø Centre 2011a). Scholars moreover emphasize that the CDM has started to 
generate environmental technological transfer (Dechezleprêtre, Glachant and Ménière 2008; 
Larson et al. 2008; Benecke 2009) as well as a substantial transfer of finance from 
industrialized to developing countries (Fuhr and Lederer 2009: 332). In addition, due to an 
increasing market share of projects in the renewable energy, fuel switching and energy 
efficiency sectors, the potential of the CDM to contribute to sustainable development in 
developing countries has significantly risen in the past few years (Pattberg and Stripple 2008: 
375). Furthermore, some authors point out that the CDM has several unintended positive side-
effects. They argue that, due to the introduction of the CDM, governments and local 
authorities in developing countries have considerably enhanced their capacity to deal with 
climate policy issues (Fuhr and Lederer 2009: 339). Hence, the CDM provides a crucial 
instrument for the integration of developing countries into the international climate regime 
(Grubb, Vrolijk and Brack 1999: 133-138; Michaelowa 2005: 305; Streck 2007: 92). These 
countries have, so far, no obligations to reduce GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. 
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Additionally ? and very important with regard to the criticisms sketched above ? the CDM 
?has shown that it can evolve, adapt and improve??(UNFCCC 2007) as noted by Yvo de Boer, 
the former Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC. Recently, this has been underscored by the 
establishment of the Program of Activities as a new CDM modality (CDM Executive Board 
2007: 17). This innovation is supposed to render the CDM more accessible to small and 
medium-sized enterprises as well as to small countries, which do not have large single site 
sources of GHG emissions and which have hence been excluded from the CDM in its earlier 
form (Hinostroza et al. 2009). 
Thus, while the current design of the CDM suffers from a number of inherent 
shortcomings, the CDM can be regarded as an evolving market-based instrument which is 
open to amendment in the post-Kyoto era (cf. Lövbrand, Rindefjäll and Nordqvist 2009: 76). 
The various concrete proposals for a reformed CDM (Stripple 2010: 76-80) suggest that the 
mechanism is still seen as a promising governance arrangement in the area of global climate 
policy-making (cf. Paulsson 2009: 76). 
 
The CDM as a new mode of global climate governance 
Several scholars of global environmental politics describe the CDM as an innovative mode of 
governance which is supposed to open the door for broader participation by non-state actors 
and less hierarchical forms of steering in global climate policy-making (for example 
Bäckstrand 2008: 90-91; Lövbrand, Rindefjäll and Nordqvist 2009; Stripple 2010). The CDM 
involves a wide range of non-state actors such as multilateral institutions, private corporations 
and non-governmental organizations which perform various functions in the CDM project 
cycle, from the identification and design of individual projects over their validation, 
registration and monitoring to the verification, certification and issuance of carbon credits (cf. 
Pattberg and Stripple 2008: 375).6 In addition, the CDM represents a market-based instrument 
that is characterized by a mix of public and private forms of regulation (Bäckstrand et al. 
2010). While the regulatory framework of the CDM has been established by national 
governments and the basic rules and procedures are negotiated at diplomatic conferences, the 
day-to-day management of the mechanism is conducted by an intergovernmental body and 
private auditing corporations that evaluate the environmental performance of individual 
projects. The role of these private corporations, labeled Designated Operational Entities 
(DOEs), in the regulatory framework of the CDM is particularly interesting because they 
represent an instance of delegated private authority in global climate governance. Despite 
                                                
6 For a concise overview of the different actors involved in the CDM, see the article by Streck (2007). 
Thomas Hickmann: Private Authority in Global Climate Governance: The Case of the Clean Development Mechanism 
9 
their important function in the CDM, relatively little scholarly attention has been paid to the 
DOEs.7 The DOEs are primarily large multinational auditing corporations that are responsible 
for the validation and verification of CDM project activities. In the validation process of a 
project, the DOEs assess whether a proposed project meets the requirements of the CDM; in 
the verification phase, the DOEs review the GHG emission reductions that have been 
achieved through a certain project. Hence, the DOEs are entrusted with the important task to 
supervise the quality of the CDM projects and to ensure the environmental integrity of the 
market-based instrument (cf. Paulsson 2009: 66). However, the top institution in the 
regulatory framework of the CDM is the CDM Executive Board that, inter alia, accredits the 
DOEs and may also suspend or withdraw their accreditation if it is not satisfied with the 
performance of certain corporations. The Executive Board, in turn, ???????????? ????????ority 
???? ?????????? ??? ???? Conferences of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties 
????? ???? ??? ?????? ??? ??? ??????? ????????????? (UNFCCC 2002: 27). Thus, while private 
corporations are engaged in authoritative decision-making and perform central governance 
functions in the CDM, they operate in a ????????????????????? with background conditions of 
public authority, state intervention and governmental control (cf. Bäckstrand et al. 2010: 13). 
This complex mix of public and private authority in the regulatory framework of the CDM 
will be analyzed in more detail in the following section of this paper by focusing on the 
critical function of the DOEs. 
 
The  complex  mix  of  public  and  private  authority  in  the  CDM  
As indicated above, the CDM has a rather hierarchical regulatory structure. The supreme 
authority in the regulatory framework of the CDM is shared among governments in the CDM 
Executive Board (cf. Pattberg and Stripple 2008: 375). This multilateral institution consists of 
ten members and ten alternates who are elected by governments according to a specific quota 
system (UNFCCC 2006: 32-36). The members of the Executive Board take various regulatory 
decisions. Their most important responsibilities are (i) the accreditation of the DOEs, (ii) the 
approval of methodologies used to evaluate the project activities, (iii) the registration of the 
projects and (iv) the issuance of carbon credits (UNFCCC 2002: 27-31). Hence, the Executive 
Board has the final say about whether a CDM project will be implemented or not and takes 
the final decision on how many carbon credits are attributed to a project activity. In these 
tasks, the members of the Executive Board are supported by committees, expert panels and 
                                                
7 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????(2008a) and the analysis on 
???????????????????????????????????????????und (2010). 
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working groups (cf. Streck 2007: 93-95). Hitherto, five of these ad hoc institutions have been 
established.8 The creation of the Registration and Issuance Team is especially interesting for 
the analysis in this paper. This institution was established in 2006 after concerns had been 
raised about problems in the performance of certain DOEs due to their profit-seeking behavior 
(Schneider 2007: 22; Lund 2010: 282). Its task is to assist the Executive Board to review 
whether the DOEs have appropriately validated and verified the CDM project activities. In 
other words, the Registration and Issuance Team is supposed to ensure that the DOEs act in 
accordance with the rules and procedures of the CDM (cf. Green 2008a: 41). In addition, the 
UNFCCC Secretariat started to assess the work of the DOEs in 2007 and gives advice to the 
Executive Board which projects should undergo a review process (Schneider 2007: 22-23). 
Another option for the Executive Board to control the work of the DOEs is to conduct 
unscheduled surveillances of selected DOEs in collaboration with the Accreditation Panel 
(UNFCCC 2002: 30). These so-called spot checks shall enhance the compliance with the rules 
and procedures of the CDM among the DOEs. If the Executive Board detects serious non-
conformities with the rules and procedures of the CDM, such as that a DOE lacks sufficiently 
qualified personnel or cannot provide evidence that it actually has undertaken an independent 
technical review of a certain project activity, the Executive Board may suspend or withdraw 
the accreditation of the respective DOE (UNFCCC 2002: 31). Although the withdrawal or 
suspension of a DOE needs to be formally adopted by governments represented at the 
COP/MOP, the decision taken by the Executive Board enters into force immediately on a 
provisional basis after it has made its recommendation (UNFCCC 2002: 31). The Executive 
Board has in recent years considerably increased the number of spot checks of DOEs and 
between late 2008 and early 2010 suspended four DOEs (Schneider and Mohr 2010: 17-19).9 
Thus, the Executive Board has wide-ranging competencies in the regulatory framework of the 
CDM. The establishment of the Registration and Issuance Team, the expanded competence of 
the UNFCCC Secretariat to assess the work of the DOEs as well as the increased use of spot 
checks and the ensuing suspension of a number of DOEs has, according to Emma Lund, 
moreover, strengthened the rule-based character of the regulatory framework of the CDM 
(2010: 286). 
                                                
8 The Accreditation Panel that assists the Executive Board to accredit the DOEs, the Methodologies Panel that 
develops guidelines for the methodologies used to assess the projects, the Afforestation and Reforestation 
Working Group and the Small Scale Working Group that provide recommendations on specific projects as well 
as the Registration and Issuance Team that assists the Executive Board in questions regarding project 
registration and the issuance of carbon credits (UNFCCC 2011a). 
9 These DOEs have already been re-accredited under the CDM (CDM Executive Board 2010: 3). 
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However, despite the gradual tightening of the oversight by the Executive Board, 
several indications suggest that the Executive Board is not able to effectively run the CDM 
and that the functionality of the regulatory framework of the CDM is compromised by the 
profit-seeking behavior of the DOEs. First, the decisions taken by the Executive Board 
regarding the regulation of the CDM are largely based on the information provided by the 
DOEs which conduct the on-the-ground supervision of the CDM project activities. Although 
the Executive Board is supported by several experts, a comprehensive and detailed review of 
whether the DOEs have appropriately validated and verified the numerous projects is 
apparently beyond its capacity. Hence, the Executive Board has to a large extent rely on the 
discretion of the DOEs which they may use to increase their own profit at the expense of the 
??????????????????????????????(Lund 2010: 283). Second, the DOEs are being selected and 
paid by the project developers (i.e. companies from Annex 1 countries seeking to receive 
carbon credits by investing in CDM projects) that they are supposed to supervise. If a DOE, 
for instance, strictly interprets the rules of additionality, the corporation will risk not to be 
chosen again by the project developer for the validation and verification process of future 
CDM projects. The DOEs have, therefore, a clear incentive to get the project approved in 
order to increase their overall amount of validation and verification assignments. This causes 
a conflict of interests among the DOEs due to their profit-seeking ambition and their 
concurrent regulatory function in the CDM (McCully 2008: 11; de Sépibus 2009: 14-15; Lund 
2010: 281-282). Third, and related to the previous point, the DOEs often lack adequate 
information on project activities (de Sépibus 2009: 15). When the DOEs validate and verify 
CDM projects, they depend very much on the information they receive from the project 
developers. The DOE that supervises a project has only rarely the opportunity to countercheck 
the data provided by their clients or to consult independent sources (Lederer 2010: 6-7). And 
for the reason stated above, they neither have an incentive to do so. Fourth, the DOEs are also 
involved in the development of new methodologies that are, for instance, used to calculate the 
amount of carbon credits attributable to a certain project activity (UNFCCC 2002: 35). While 
the Executive Board formally approves the methodologies in coordination with the 
Methodologies Panel, this means that the DOEs have not only a large influence on the 
implementation but also on the formulation of the rules and procedures of the CDM. Fifth, 
due to their highly specialized knowledge about the validation and verification of project 
activities and because of the limited number of corporations that have been accredited as 
DOEs with the Executive Board, several DOEs have created their own niche markets. 
According to data from the ???????????????????????????????????????Risø Centre for Energy, 
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Climate and Sustainable Development (UNEP Risø Centre), the six largest DOEs (out of 
currently 37) have validated almost 85 percent and verified more than 90 percent of all 
projects (UNEP Risø Centre 2011b). Moreover, many DOEs are specialized in only a fraction 
of the 15 different sectoral scopes of the CDM, which means that they validate and verify 
only project activities of a particular type (e.g. only afforestation and reforestation projects). 
According to the rules and procedures of the CDM, validation and verification of a project 
have to be undertaken by two different DOEs (UNFCCC 2002: 32).10 This reduces the 
incentive for the DOEs to approve a project solely in order to receive the assignment for the 
verification phase of the same project. Because of the limited number of DOEs which 
dominate the market and due to the specialization of some DOEs, there is, however, a risk of 
collusion between the DOEs (Green 2008a: 22). The corporations have an incentive to favor 
each other since they will probably be soon in the reverse position and hence expect 
reciprocal benefits from their behavior (Green 2008a: 49-50; Lund 2010: 282). These five 
instances demonstrate the critical role of the DOEs in the regulatory framework of the CDM 
and point to serious trade-offs which accompany the delegation of authority to private actors. 
 
The CDM regulatory framework in need for a reform 
While the question of how these trade-offs could be adequately resolved cannot fully be 
addressed here, two proposals for a reformed CDM can be derived from the previous analysis. 
First, the DOEs should no longer be selected and paid by the project developers. Because of 
their profit-seeking ambition, the DOEs have an economic incentive to positively validate or 
verify a CDM project activity, even if the project does not conform to the rules and 
procedures of the CDM. The DOEs seek to establish a favourable reputation among their 
clients by granting them a positive evaluation in order to receive as many validation and 
verification assignments as possible (cf. Lund 2010: 281-282). Different scholars have, 
therefore, proposed to transfer the responsibility for the selection of the DOEs to the 
Executive Board or the UNFCCC Secretariat (Haya 2007: 10; Schneider 2007: 56-57; 
McCully 2008: 13). This suggestion addresses a major problem in the regulatory framework 
of the CDM and would solve the conflict of interest among the DOEs (cf. Lund 2010: 286). 
Second, public control over the performance of the DOEs needs to be tightened (cf. Schneider 
2007: 21). A first step in this direction has been taken with the development of the Validation 
                                                
10 This rule does not apply to evaluations of small-scale projects (UNFCCC 2006: 46). In exceptional cases the 
Executive Board may, moreover, allow a single DOE to perform both the validation and the verification of a 
certain project activity (UNFCCC 2002: 32). 
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and Verification Manual adopted by the Executive Board in late 2008 (CDM Executive Board 
2008: 3). The aim of this Manual is to provide clearer guidance for the DOEs when they 
validate and verify project activities and to increase consistency among DOEs in the 
application of the rules and procedures of the CDM (cf. Lund 2010: 285). In addition, the 
Executive Board has recently launched a Policy F ramework to address non-compliance by 
DOEs (CDM Executive Board 2009: 3). This initiative is only in its initial phase and still 
contains several weaknesses (Schneider and Mohr 2010: 25-27). However, if this approach is 
further strengthened, it will prospectively enhance the rule-based character of the regulatory 
framework of the CDM. These two reform proposals can certainly not sort out all weaknesses 
of the current regulatory design of the CDM, but they would render the CDM less susceptible 




This paper has shown that the regulatory framework of the CDM is characterized by a 
complex mix of public and private authority. While the DOEs are entrusted with the important 
task to supervise the quality of the CDM projects, they ???????? ??? ?? ??????????????????????
with background conditions of public authority, state intervention and governmental control. 
The Executive Board which is accountable to governments represented at the COP/MOP 
holds the supreme authority in the regulatory framework of the CDM and can use the support 
of a number of experts, including the UNFCCC Secretariat, to control the work of the DOEs. 
However, the empirical analysis in this paper casts doubt on the question whether the 
Executive Board is able to effectively run the CDM and has pointed to serious trade-offs 
which accompany the delegation of authority to private actors. First, when the Executive 
Board takes regulatory decisions, it highly depends on the information provided by the DOEs. 
Second, the DOEs are being paid by the project developers that they are supposed to 
supervise, causing a conflict of interests among the DOEs. Third, the DOEs have no incentive 
to critically assess the data they receive from the project developers. Fourth, the DOEs are 
involved in the development of the methodologies used to calculate the amount of carbon 
credits attributable to a certain project activity, enabling them to influence the formulation of 
the rules and procedures of the CDM. Fifth, due to the relatively small number of accredited 
DOEs, the market dominance attained by a few corporations and the resulting niche markets 
in the CDM, there is a risk of collusion between the DOEs. 
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From a theoretical perspective, the role of the DOEs in the regulatory framework of 
the CDM represents an interesting instance of private actors performing important governance 
functions in global (environmental) policy-making. Although the findings from the case study 
on the CDM cannot easily be generalized, they can be approached as illustrative examples of 
the consequences associated with the growing involvement of private actors in authoritative 
decision-making. The key theoretical conclusion that can be drawn from this paper is that the 
promise of innovative modes of governance to increase the effectiveness of international 
regulation is seriously compromised by the profit-seeking behavior of private actors. 
Apparently, this problem will only be solved if the rule-based character of private governance 
arrangements will be consolidated and if the delegation of authority to private actors will be 
conditioned by public control. Otherwise, private actors might use their powerful role to 
increase their own profit at public expense. This can be illustrated by returning to the case of 
the CDM. If the DOEs do not critically validate and verify the CDM project activities and 
strictly interpret the rules of additionality, more carbon credits will be issued by the Executive 
Board than GHG emissions are actually reduced. Hence, without the effective operation of its 
regulatory framework, the CDM will in fact generate a net increase in global GHG emissions 
and reinforce the problem of climate change. This example underscores that the consequences 
associated with the privatization of authority need to be thoroughly analyzed and suggests that 
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